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Two-dimensional truth
Wolfgang Spohn
Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz
e paper identies two major strands of truth theories, ontological and episte-
mological ones, and argues that both are of equal primacy and nd their home
within two-dimensional semantics. Contrary to received views, it argues further
that epistemological truth theories operate on Lewisian possible worlds and onto-
logical truth theories on Wittgensteinian possible worlds and that both are medi-
ated by the so-called epistemic-ontic map the further specication of which is of
utmost philosophical importance.
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is paper purports to tell something about truth that appears new and in-
sightful to me. is is an outrageously immodest aim. erefore I hasten
to add that this paper is of a most tentative nature. If it succeeds to unfold
a frame that inspires further more careful thoughts, it would already full
its purpose. Let me start by very swily rehearsing some basics concerning
the state of the art about truth. is rehearsal is bound to be biased and
incomplete, in order to prepare for the main part of the paper.
First, we must take a stance towards truth bearers and truth makers. Let
me short-cut the rich and sophisticated discussion about this issue (see, e.g.,
Armstrong 1997, ch. 8, or Künne 2003, sect. 3.5) by simply assuming that
truth bearers are propositions—or states of aairs, as I shall sometimes say,
though this is a delicate substitution—and that truth makers are worlds. A
lot is prejudged thereby, but not everything, since we do not really know
what propositions and worlds are.
My assumption entails that, whatever propositions are, they are such that
all other potential truth bearers are true or false only in virtue of the propo-
sitions associated with them.is is plausible at least for themain rival truth
bearers. Beliefs are true or false in virtue of their content, and contents are
supposed to be propositions. Sentences or utterances are true or false, if
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they have a truth value at all, in virtue of their meanings, and their mean-
ings presumably consist in the propositions expressed by them. ereby I
seem to equate contents of beliefs and meanings of sentences or utterances.
Yes, almost; but this also belongs to the things not yet prejudged and to be
reconsidered.
As to truth makers, I have simply moved to the safe side. Some truth
bearers may be true independently of anything, but most of them need not
be true and, if true, are made true by something.is cannot be more than
an entire world. Mostly, it is much less; each truth is made true only by some
part of the world. To substantiate this would require, though, explaining
how parts of worlds are to be understood for this purpose and which part
then is responsible for which truth. Staying on the safe sidemeans refraining
from entering these issues.
My assumption also entails that truth is basically a relation between pro-
positions and worlds; a proposition is true in a world (and hence true sim-
pliciter, if true in the actual world—whichever that is). Since propositions
are moreover assumed to be nothing but, as it were, capabilities to be true
or false, nothing but truth conditions, to use traditional terminology, it is
clear that propositions can be represented by, or equatedwith, sets of worlds.
However, this does not yet x the truth relation. Nor does it tell what propo-
sitions and worlds are. It only says that they are related in such a way that
propositions can consequently be represented as sets of worlds.
When the truth relation is not yet xed by my assumption, what is it
then?e history of philosophy provides many answers. Perhaps the oldest
is what has been called the existence theory of truth: a proposition or a state
of aairs is true if and only if it exists. It was a big topic in ancient philosophy
that in some sense falsities cannot exist, as the existence theory entails.is
was a big topic since it creates great problems, for instance, how one could
ever have false beliefs or how there could ever be false sentences. I confess I
nd these problems misguided, and I do not see a way to take the existence
theory of truth seriously. Let us simply put it to one side.
e other old conception, indeed the dominant one ever since, is, of
course, the correspondence theory of truth. A proposition, or whatever ex-
presses it or conceives of it, is true if and only if it corresponds to the facts. I
say it is still the dominant conception since I take most of the theories dis-
cussed in the last 60 years to be mere variations: the semantic conception of
truth, the redundancy theory, the disquotationalist theory, minimalist con-
ceptions, other conceptions of the deationary kind, and even the identity
theory (for all this see, e.g., Künne 2003, ch. 3, 4, and 6, or Engel 2002, sect.
1.2+6 and ch. 2). I know, of course, that it is dangerous to level all the sub-
tle dierences between these theories. I am fascinated by the discussions of
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these dierences, and I would never claim that these discussions are idle.
Still, from a suciently detached point of view, as we are bound to have it
here, they all look similar; they all ght with the point that the linguistic
means for describing or referring to the truth bearer and the truth maker
look almost identical so that the truth relation appears somehow trivial. In-
deed, I am unsure whether the illusion of substance was even held in the
old times from which the label ‘correspondence theory’ derives, as is sup-
posed by the modern variants eager to dissociate themselves from the old
times. So, as far as I see, I can simply ignore the dierences for the present
purposes. One may point out that this neglect is entailed already by my de-
cision to take propositions as truth bearers; all these subtleties are thereby
erased. Yes, I admit this; this was indeed one goal of my decision.
ere is nally a much younger and much less clear-cut family of truth
theories, starting with the pragmatic theory of truth of Charles S. Peirce and
William James at the turn of the last century and followed by ideas for a
coherence theory of truth (see, e.g., Rescher 1973). e consensus theory
(see Habermas 1973) made some contribution to this direction. Putnam’s
internal realism is to be listed here (best displayed in his 1983). Recently we
have seen attempts to conceive truth as a kind of evaluational concept (see
Ellis 1990). And so on.ese theories are quite indeterminate and indeter-
minately dierent. For instance, the pragmatic theory takes truth to be the
limit of inquiry, something desperately in need of explication.e coherence
theory suers from its continuous inability to characterize coherence more
sharply than by metaphorics. e consensus theory seems atly wrong, if
not soened to the pragmatic theory. And so forth again.
It is easy therefore to ridicule this family of truth theories; nothing of
that indeterminate kind could ever be said to give a denition of truth. De-
fenders oen retreated to the position that theywere oering only a criterion
of truth.is may even be an enlightening hint. For the time being, though,
it is not particularly helpful, since the notion of a criterion is as obscure as
the truth theories it is to characterize.
What lets me count these theories as one family is a negative point they
all share: a dissatisfaction with the correspondence theory and its variations.
Let me try to sketch this dissatisfaction.
A rst cause of concern certainly is the afore-mentioned triviality of the
correspondence theory. Somehow, truth seems to be something substantial
and important. So, if the correspondence theory does not get beyond its
platitudes, there must be other ways to say more about truth. at is the
mind-boggling quandary: you want to say more, but you cannot. I guess
this partially explains the desperate intensity of the discussion among the
variants of the correspondence theory: if you cannot say more, you at least
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want to get right the little you can say.
Let us try, though, to get at the content of the disappointment. It consists,
I think, in the fact that the correspondence theory as such is completely silent
about the epistemological side of truth, how we learn the truth, whether
we approach the truth, how, if ever, we can determine the truth. Rather,
the correspondence theory stays entirely on the ontological side. ere are
two kinds of entities, truth bearers and truth makers, whether or not we
conceive of them as I decided to do here, and there is a specic relation
between them called truth. e misfortune is that the two kinds of entities
are described or referred to by the same, or more or less the same linguistic
means; whence the appearance of triviality. In the contemporary variants
the ontological dimension is easily overlooked, since truth theory is rather
treated as an intralinguistic play that can be studied neglecting the referential
aspect of language. As soon as one puts back that aspect into the picture, the
ontological character of the correspondence theory reappears.
One may counter that the epistemological side of truth belongs to epis-
temology, not to truth theory. Yes, maybe. Onemight still reply that in order
to do its job properly epistemology must connect up with truth theory and
that the correspondence theory or its variants are not responsive in this re-
spect. I am unsure which stance to take in this dispute; I am even unsure
whether I have to take a stance. As long as it is merely a dispute about the
delineation of disciplines, it appears quite immaterial. In any case, the feel-
ing of dissatisfaction remains.
So, where do we stand? Or rather, if the description given so far is as fair
as it can be on three pages, how canwemove ahead? One thing that urgently
needs to be done is to improve on the state of the second family—let us call
them the epistemological truth theories.is is very dicult; if it would not
be so, these theories would already be in much better shape. And though I
clearly see the need, I have nothing rm to oer in response.
If one had a better picture there, it would be of great help. Still, it would
not settle the question how to bring all the truth theories I have mentioned
into a scheme.is is another thing urgently needed. I would like to empha-
size at this point that I have mentioned all the main oers on the market in
my sketch.at is, it is not so that we should only look at theory X not men-
tioned so far in order to possess a more satisfactory scheme.e point also
means that a scheme for the theories mentioned would indeed be a scheme
for the theory of truth altogether; no important strand would be simply ig-
nored.
So, how should we integrate the two families of truth theories, the onto-
logical and the epistemological family, into one picture? Should we accept
the unequal distinction between a primary denition and a secondary crite-
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rion of truth and try to elaborate on it? In the sequel, I would like to pursue
a dierent idea, the idea to embed the theory of truth into two-dimensional
semantics that I think to be the leading paradigm in philosophical seman-
tics; it could actually have acquired a status of orthodoxy already if it would
not present itself in such a torn state. In order to explain this idea, I have to
explain the essentials of two-dimensional semantics quite independently of
all truth theoretic concerns.
Two-dimensional semantics is 30 years old, but its history is the history
of the philosophy of language in general that moved into the center of theo-
retical philosophy in the beginning of the 20th century and was, no doubt,
the most important philosophical achievement of its rst seven decades.
However, the theories of meaning developed there were burdened with an
original sin. Meaning has an ontological aspect, since it comprises refer-
ence; with our words we describe and refer to what is. And meaning has an
epistemological aspect, since it is more or less synonymous with cognitive
signicance; with our words we express our beliefs about what is. (More-
over, we do a lot of things with words; but this is not our present focus.)
ese two aspects were, however, hopelessly confused since (Frege 1892).
e confusion shows up in the continuous double purpose intensions and
propositions had to, but could not serve, in the continuous indecision be-
tween veriability (or assertibility) and truth conditions, and at many other
places.
e radical change came with Kripke (1972) and Putnam (1975) (and
those preparing the ground like Dagnn Føllesdal and BarcanMarcus—see,
e.g., Føllesdal 2005).ey pushed the ontological reading of intensions and
propositions so forcefully that one could no longer mix it with epistemo-
logical ingredients and thus continue on the confusion. e hallmark of
the change is Kripke’s reform of modalities. ere is (metaphysical) neces-
sity (and possibility), there is apriority or epistemic necessity (and possibil-
ity), and the two are independent; analyticity is down-graded to a derivative
notion and dened as a priori metaphysical necessity. However, necessity
and apriority were not yet on a par; modal logic and intensional semantics
were then reserved for the ontological aspect, and there was at rst no cor-
responding theorizing for apriority.
is changed only with Kaplan (1989) and Stalnaker (1978), the birth of
two-dimensional semantics inmy view.e grand picture that thus emerged
is this: ere is the set of epistemic possibilities, there is the set of ontic
possibilities, and there is a correspondence mapping epistemic onto ontic
possibilities. Whether or not this correspondence is something substantial
is not clear. In the beginning it was thought to be trivial and thus slipped
attention—still a wide-spread attitude. However, since it will acquire some
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importance here, let us give it a name and call it the epistemic-ontic map
or the EO-map, for short. In the simplest case, assumed by Stalnaker, for
instance, both kinds of possibilities are just possible worlds, and the EO-
map is identity. Together, these two sets span a two-dimensional space of
possibilities.
Now, every word or phrase receives, in a recursive way, a two-dimen-
sional meaning that assigns a type-adequate extension to each point of this
two-dimensional space of possibilities. is sounds abstract and formalis-
tic, but it is most substantial. Let me explain this with the familiar example
of the word ‘water’. e two-dimensional meaning of ‘water’ provides an
ontic intension for each epistemic possibility or situation. For instance, in
the epistemic situation we actually live in the extension of ‘water’ is, for all
we know, H2O (in uid form); and since ‘water’ is a substance word and
hence a rigid designator, its extension is H2O also in all other ontic possibil-
ities. ere are other epistemic possibilities, though, that we excluded aer
the rise of modern chemistry. In one of it, water might have turned out to
be Putnam’s XYZ; then water would have been XYZ in all ontic possibilities.
Water might also have turned out to be amixture of two or three substances;
then water could have been any mixture of these two or three substances in
other ontic possibilities. Each attempt to nd a physical structure below the
phenomenological level might have failed.en the ontic intension of ‘wa-
ter’ would have contained any kind of stu with the same phenomenological
properties water has for us.us, what is water in an ontic possibility from
the perspective of our actual epistemic situation need not be water from the
perspective of a dierent epistemic possibility, and vice versa. In this way
the ontic intension of a linguistic expression may vary with the epistemic
situation.
e two-dimensional meaning does not only contain an ontic intension
for each epistemic possibility, but also an epistemic intension. How? Let us
continue on our example. For each epistemic possibility we can ask what
is water in this possibility. e two-dimensional meaning of ‘water’ pro-
vides an answer: it is the extension assigned to this epistemic possibility and
the very same possibility taken as an ontic possibility. In this way the two-
dimensional meaning denes a one-dimensional epistemic intension, i.e., a
function from epistemic possibilities to type-adequate extensions. In more
technical slang, it is the diagonal of the two-dimensionalmeaning and hence
also called diagonal intension. It is clear, though, that the denition of the
diagonal involves what I called the EO-map; an epistemic possibility taken
as an ontic possibility is just the EO-map of that epistemic possibility.
e epistemic intension of our example, the word ‘water’, is not easily de-
scribed.e best short description is perhaps the one of Putnam (1975)—see
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also the detailed discussion in (Haas-Spohn 1995, sect. 3.1–2)—that in each
epistemic possibility the extension of ‘water’ consists of those samples that
consists of the same uid as those examples that we take there as our familiar
paradigms of water. One dicult point here is that each of the paradigms is
defeasible, though not most of them. Another diculty clearly recognized
by Putnam is that consisting of the same uid is not well determined, but
stands for whatever empirical research on that epistemic possibility would
end up classifying as the same uid. We abbreviate this by saying that ‘water’
is a substance word or a natural kind term; but this only hides most complex
epistemic dispositions.
What I have thus explained and exemplied is how the two-dimensional
meaning determines two kinds of intensions: an epistemic intension and
for each epistemic possibility an ontic intension. One can view, however,
the matter the other way around. We may start with a word’s epistemic in-
tension, then project its ontic intension in a given epistemic situation from
its extension in this situation (i.e., assigned to this situation by its epistemic
intension), and thus arrive at its two-dimensional meaning.is is, in a nut-
shell, David Kaplan’s (1989) theory of direct reference.
Kripke’s (1972) pair of modalities is well accounted for within this con-
ceptual scheme. A sentence expresses an (unrevisably) a priori truth if its
epistemic intension assigns truth to each epistemic possibility; there is no
way then for such a sentence to turn out false. And in a given epistemic sit-
uation a sentence expresses a metaphysical necessity if its ontic intension in
this situation assigns truth to each ontic possibility; in that situation this sen-
tence could not be false. (Finally, a sentence is analytic if its two-dimensional
meaning always assigns truth.) is must suce as a very rough sketch of
two-dimensional semantics.
e picture oers a grand promise. ere are ontology and epistemol-
ogy, the two basic disciplines of theoretical philosophy.ey span the space
of meaning, the third fundamental topic. Two-dimensional semantics then
promises to clearly separate ontological and epistemological aspects ofmean-
ing and at the same time to articulate their relation, in terms of the EO-
map and diagonalization.ere is hardly anything deeper to accomplish in
theoretical philosophy. Chalmers (2006) speaks no less emphatically of the
golden triangle of meaning, reason, and modality. I am convinced that this
formal frame is basically sound and a great theoretical advance.ere is al-
ways the danger to distort phenomena in order to squeeze them into a given
frame. My continuous experience, however, is the reverse, namely that the
two-dimensional frame is of great help in getting clear about the phenom-
ena.
I should not give the impression, though, that two-dimensional seman-
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tics and its interpretation would be a settled aair. It is not at all. It has sur-
prisingly little radiated outside philosophy. And within philosophy its claim
is contested. Even among its supporters its interpretation is contested, as is
indicated by the fact that the two kinds of intension carry several dierent
names (see, e.g., the impressive list of possible interpretations in Chalmers
2006).ere are indeedmany subtle dierences and distinctions that should
be observed and critically discussed in a thorough treatment of the topic.
Let us neglect these disagreements, though, since I am aer more basic is-
sues that arise howeverwe resolve these disagreements and that I have hardly
seen addressed.at is, I would like tomore closely consider the basic archi-
tecture of two-dimensional semantics. One reason is, of course, that we can-
not really understand two-dimensional semantics without being clear about
its foundations.e other more topical reason is that we may thereby make
progress on our truth theoretic quandary.
As I have explained, the basic architecture consists of ontic and epis-
temic possibilities and the EO-map connecting them. So, the rst question
must be: what are these ontic and epistemic possibilities? Well, they must
be possible in some sense, they must be mutually exclusive, i.e., they are not
compossible; they must be exhaustive, i.e., there must not be any further
possibility besides them; and they must be maximal in some sense, i.e., no
contingency may remain undecided in any of them. Because of the latter,
philosophers tend to call them possible worlds.
Still, these basic assumptions do not inform us about the nature of those
possible worlds. As long as we conne ourselves to doing modal logic or
formal semantics, we need not know more, however. ere it is ne to as-
sume just a non-empty setW the elements of which are do-not-cares called
possible worlds.
In the same attitude, one may say that both, ontic and epistemic possi-
bilities, are possible worlds, whatever these are. In this case, the EO-map
simply reduces to identity. Most would grant, though, that epistemic possi-
bilities are slightly more complicated, namely centered possible worlds.e
reason is (see Lewis 1979) that I may have beliefs de se and de nunc that are
aboutme or about the presence directly and not via the presentation by some
eternal description. If the contents of such beliefs are to be represented as
sets of possibilities, these must be centered worlds, i.e., triples ⟨w , s, t⟩ con-
sisting of an uncentered worldw and a center, i.e., a subject s and a time t in
the center. ereby, however, the EO-map hardly becomes less trivial; now
it is truncation, cutting o the center from a centered world and leaving an
uncentered world.
Indeed, I have argued in (Spohn 2008, ch. 16) that epistemic possibilities
should be augmented even by a sequence of possible objects; that is, however,
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a dierent issue. Whenwe look at linguistic applications of two-dimensional
semantics, then we nd epistemic and ontic possibilities being called con-
texts and indices. Indices do not only contain worlds, but everything that
can be shied or quantied in natural language, and contexts contain con-
textual parameters on which the reference of linguistic phrases may depend
(see, e.g., Lewis 1980 for further explanation). Still, contexts consist of larger
lists of parameters than indices—this must be so, if diagonalization is to be
applicable—, and the EO-map is again nothing but truncation.
As philosophers we cannot be content with these statements; we still
do not know what the basic entities, the possible worlds are. My impres-
sion is that the default answer has become: Lewisian worlds (as explained
and defended in book length in Lewis 1986). Apparently, the criticism in
(Lewis 1986, part 3) of all the other ways of conceiving possible worlds has
proved to be convincing. A Lewisian possible world is a maximal possible
object endowedwith some space-time analogous extension relative to which
maximality makes sense at all. is extension need not be Euclidean (and
hence need not conform toKant’s a priori forms of intuition). What precisely
counts as space-time analogous is not so clear; even Lewis himself remains
inconclusive (see Lewis 1986, sect. 1.6). Moreover, a Lewisian world is fully
determinate. Everything there is to it is essentially so. Each dierencemakes
for another possible world and not for the same world with slightly dierent
features.
So, this is what possible worlds usually are supposed to be. I have indi-
cated the negative argument. One hardly nds a positive argument, though;
maybe emphasizing that Lewisianworlds aremetaphysically possible worlds
already qualies them as ontic possibilities. Add a center, and you have an
epistemic possibility, requiring just truncation as EO-map.at is then the
complete basic architecture for two-dimensional semantics.
e latter point, however, is a bad argument. Whenever I assume some-
thing for whatever purposes, this assumption is of an ontological character;
that alone does not yetmake it an ontic possibility as used in two-dimensional
semantics.
Indeed, at least Chalmers (2006) has doubts about the architecture. He
calls epistemic possibilities scenarios. To understand scenarios as centered
metaphysically possible worlds is one feasible option for him. He prefers
another option, though, because it is more illuminating or because the rst
option rests on assumptions that may not be acceptable. According to this
second option, scenarios are maximal hypotheses, i.e., linguistic-conceptual
constructions, and he thinks there is a neutral canonical vocabulary for ex-
pressing such maximal hypotheses. Now the EO-map turns into something
substantial. It presupposes at least the claim that for each scenario there is a
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unique Lewisian possible world (and a unique center) that is completely de-
scribed by the scenario. I have no clear objection against Chalmers’ concep-
tion. However, I deeply mistrust Chalmers’ conceptual foundationalism, his
idea that ontological supervenience of everything on fundamental physics
(whatever that is) could be copied on the conceptual side. Carnap’s Logis-
cher Aufbau did not work; no successor did get much farther; and if the
many intimations in the literature about the holistic character of concepts
(see, e.g., Esfeld 2001) are basically true, such programmes cannot work.
Still, I nd Chalmers’ thinking congenial at least insofar as he takes the EO-
map as something deeply in need of explanation.
In any case, my picture is a dierent one. I think that Lewisian worlds,
or rather centered Lewisian worlds, are precisely suited as epistemic possi-
bilities. I said that a Lewisian world is a fully determinate maximal object.
However, such a maximal object is a maximal black box for us; it is entirely
unknown, indeed unconceived. It is the raw material of our epistemic en-
deavour. us, an epistemic possibility is not something constructed out
of concepts prefabricated in our mind; it is rather something concrete, real,
and external on which we can try and exercise our minds, just as our actual
universe. In fact, it is something containing us at some time, whatever we
are. Hence, an epistemic possibility must be a centered Lewisian world. We
might also call such an epistemic possibility a noumenal world in the sense
of Kant (1781/87), if we avoid the association of there being an inaccessible
or unknowable reality. It is rather the as yet inaccessed and unknown point
of departure of our cognitive eorts.
Now, confronted with such a Lewisian world we develop concepts and
form beliefs. Concept formation has presuppositions. Worlds that would
not stimulate our senses do not even allow us to form purely perceptual con-
cepts. Deferential concepts require the embedding into a linguistic commu-
nity to defer to. And so forth. e concepts we actually have would not t
most of the worlds, and the beliefs we actually have exclude still muchmore.
But we might have other beliefs and even other concepts, depending on the
epistemic possibility we encounter. I guess that most possibilities would be
completely dark and barren—unless we exclude them on a priori grounds
and take the sensibility and the conceptualizability of an epistemic possibil-
ity not as a harmony actually pre-established by evolution, but as an a priori
truth.
When starting the process of concept and belief formation vis á vis a Le-
wisian world, what is the goal of this process? A goal that we shall never
reach even in the case of the actual world and that is never reachable by all
human standards? Of course, we always move in the middle of the process,
very far from the beginnings and very far from the end. It is obvious that I do
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not want to draw a picture of the actual ontogenesis or phylogenesis of our
cognitive life as individuals or as a species. e purpose of my far-fetched
speculations is rather to gain at least a frame for describing the processwe are
always amidst, a frame I take two-dimensional semantics to be providing.
So, to repeat, what is the ideal end of the process of concept and belief
formation? In the end we have fully investigated the Lewisian world and
have completed our judgment about it; all the evidence, even if only coun-
terfactually available, is acquired, and all even only counterfactual ways to
improve our judgment according to our rules of rationality are exhausted.
en we have reached a state of omniscience, no proposition remains unde-
cided, we know the nature of every object and every property and relation,
andwe know all the properties of and all relations among the objects existing
in the world.
What we have thus determined is, I contend, an ontic possibility, a to-
tality of coexisting states of aairs, a possible world as Wittgenstein (1922)
has conceived it and as Armstrong has repeatedly explained it, e.g., in (Arm-
strong 1997). Lewis (1986, sect. 3.2) denounces these Wittgensteinian pos-
sible worlds as Lagadonian ersatz worlds, as he calls them, since he senses
linguistic residues. Unjustiedly, in my view. One must conceive of such
a Wittgensteinian world in a purely ontological and, to be more specic,
essentialistic way. Each object is individuated by its possibly or usually rela-
tional essence; properties and relations are individuated by metaphysically
necessary equivalence; states of aairs are built from objects, properties, and
relations; and aWittgensteinian world is a maximal collection of states of af-
fairs in which the objects have properties and relations within their ranges
of contingency (what maximality is to mean here needs to be specied).
Indeed, such a Wittgensteinian world is the essence of the corresponding
Lewisian world; all states of aairs obtaining in a Lewisian world do so nec-
essarily. (is is not to say, of course, that these states of aairs themselves
would be necessary.)
us, the EO-map is not trivial at all. It is inconceivably complex; it em-
bodies nothing less than the full transformation of a Lewisian into aWittgen-
steinianworld by a complete process of concept and belief formation. Hence,
we can substantiate the EO-map only by developing detailed accounts of this
process. Haas-Spohn and Spohn (2001) provide, I believe a crucial, though
very incomplete element of such an account. In any case, this development
seems to me be one of the most urgent philosophical tasks.
In a way, we might understand an ontic possibility, a Wittgensteinian
world, also as a phenomenal world in the sense of Kant (1781/87), when fully
conceptualized and judged. I am certainly not entitled to engage here in
Kant exegesis. Also, we should not enter Kant’s elaborate, but foreign the-
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ory of concept formation or any of his idealistic verbiage. I think, however,
that when Kant is pondering about noumena und phenomena he is partly
struggling with similar issues as we nd them at the foundations of two-
dimensional semantics.
Now I can nally close the circle of my consideration. I took proposi-
tions as truth bearers and worlds as truth makers. Now we have two kinds
of worlds, and so we have two kinds of propositions. I also said that, when
we have specied the truth relation, we can simply represent propositions as
sets of worlds, as truth conditions.is still holds, and so we have Lewisian
propositions as sets of Lewisian worlds andWittgensteinian propositions as
Wittgensteinian worlds. However, we have not yet specied the appertain-
ing truth relations; they are indeed quite dierent.
I contend that the truth relation between Wittgensteinian propositions
and worlds is the correspondence notion of truth, indeed a particularly triv-
ial version of it, i.e., almost the identity theory.ere are elementary states of
aairs built from objects, properties and relations; they can be composed by
logical or Boolean operations to form arbitrary complex states of aairs or
Wittgensteinian propositions. And such a proposition is true in a Wittgen-
steinian world if it obtains in that world, i.e., if it is included in that maximal
collection of states of aairs that is that world.is given, we can, of course,
reconstruct Wittgensteinian propositions as sets of such worlds.
With Lewisian propositions and worlds it is quite dierent. I further
contend that the truth relation appropriate to them is some as yet ill-dened
pragmatist or coherentist notion of truth.ere are elementary possible be-
lief contents built from concepts; and they can again be composed by logical
or Boolean operations to form arbitrarily complex Lewisian propositions or
belief contents. Such a proposition is true in a Lewisian world if it would
be believed aer a complete process of concept and belief formation about
this world, if it would be contained in the ideal theory about this world.is
appeals to Peirce’s ideal limit of inquiry, to Putnam’s ideal theory that cannot
be wrong, to coherentism, since considerations of coherence will enter any
process of belief formation, to rationality, of course, since ideal belief for-
mation is a rational one, and so forth. I said this is ill-dened and urgently
needs substantial clarications. is, however, must not keep us from see-
ing some such notion being required at this theoretical place. If this notion
were provided—a big ‘if ’—, then, of course, we can reconstruct Lewisian
propositions as sets of Lewisian worlds.
I cannot dispel the worry that I am relying here on too indeterminate a
notion. For those, however, who nd the correspondence notion of truth too
trivial, there may be more substantial oers. We may say, for instance, that
a Lewisian proposition, a belief content, is true in a Wittgensteinian world
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and thus corresponds to the facts if this world is the EO-map of a Lewisian
world in which the content is true. However, this notion presupposes the
notion of an EO-map that is of the same indeterminate kind as the notion
of truth for Lewisian propositions and worlds.
In any case, this is how I see the foundations of two-dimensional seman-
tics connected with the long-standing dispute about theories of truth.ere
is not a primary denition and a secondary criterion of truth. Rather, the
two big strands of truth theories are on equal footing, they nd their proper
place in the two dimensions of two-dimensional semantics, and they are re-
lated via the substantial EO-map that deserves all our further philosophical
scrutiny.
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